

WAGE: An Authenticated Encryption with a Twist

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
IACR FSE 2020

¹ Currently with University of New Brunswick, Canada


² Currently with University of Rennes 1, CNRS, IRISA, France

1. Introduction
2. Design of WAGE
3. Security Analysis and Features
4. Hardware Performance


DEVELOPMENTS IN SYMMETRIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY




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
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
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OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

- **PERMUTATION DESIGN:** We design a **hardware-friendly permutation** of size 259 bits based on a 37-stage Galois NLFSR over \mathbb{F}_{2^7} .

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
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- **SECURITY ANALYSIS:** We analyze the diffusion, algebraic, differential, and linear properties of the WAGE permutation and the WAGE authenticated encryption.

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- **SECURITY ANALYSIS:** We analyze the diffusion, algebraic, differential, and linear properties of the WAGE permutation and the WAGE authenticated encryption.
- **WG-PRBG:** We present the construction of **WG based pseudo random bit generator** with guaranteed randomness properties from WAGE.

Design of WAGE

WAGE PERMUTATION ROUND FUNCTION



- S_i^j is a 7-bit word, WGP and SB are 7-bit S-boxes, ω is a linear operation over 7-bit word, and rc_j^i are 7-bit round constants.

RATIONALE OF THE OVERALL DESIGN

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- 1 WGP S-box to 5 additional S-boxes (1 WGP + 4 SB) for faster confusion
- Extra XORs for strong diffusion in addition to feedback
- Minimal overhead for tweaking the WAGE permutation to an independent WG-PRBG

S-BOXES

- WGP S-Box: Defined over \mathbb{F}_{2^7} :

$$\text{WGP}(x) = \text{WGP7}(x^{13})$$

$$\text{WGP7}(x) = x + (x + 1)^{33} + (x + 1)^{39} + (x + 1)^{41} + (x + 1)^{104}$$

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- **SB S-Box:** Defined in a bit-wise and iterative fashion:


$$(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) \leftarrow R^5(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6)$$

$$(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) \leftarrow Q(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6)$$

$$x_0 \leftarrow x_0 \oplus 1$$

$$x_2 \leftarrow x_2 \oplus 1$$


S-BOXES (CONT.)



A block diagram of R


ROUND CONSTANTS

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- **Property:** $(rc_0^i, rc_1^i) \neq (rc_0^j, rc_1^j)$ for $0 \leq i, j \leq 110$ and $i \neq j$. Ensures that all the rounds of WAGE are distinct and provides resistance against slide and invariant subspace attacks.

NUMBER OF ROUNDS

- Number of rounds: 111
- Selection based on the security analysis: diffusion, algebraic degree, differential and linear bounds
- Overall criterion: WAGE permutation is indistinguishable from a random permutation

DIFFUSION AND ALGEBRAIC DEGREE BEHAVIOR

- **Diffusion:** Full bit diffusion in $28+28$ rounds in both forward and backward directions. 56/111 rounds are sufficient against meet-in-the-middle attacks.
- **Algebraic degree:** WGP and SB sboxes each are of degree 6. Faster growth in algebraic degree and 111 rounds provides huge security margin against algebraic attacks.

DIFFERENTIAL AND LINEAR BOUNDS

- WGP S-box: $DP = 2^{-4.4}$ and $LSC = 2^{-5.08}$
- SB S-box: $DP = 2^{-4}$ and $LSC = 2^{-5.35}$

DIFFERENTIAL AND LINEAR BOUNDS

- WGP S-box: $DP = 2^{-4.4}$ and $LSC = 2^{-5.08}$
- SB S-box: $DP = 2^{-4}$ and $LSC = 2^{-5.35}$
- **Case I:** No constraints on the positions of input and output differences
- **Case II:** Input and output differences are restricted to only rate positions

Table: Upper bounds of MEDCP and MELSC values of WAGE in $\log_2(\cdot)$ scale

	Rounds	Minimum # active sboxes	MEDCP	MELSC $\log_2(\cdot)$
Case I	74	59	$-59 \times 4 = -236$	$-59 \times 5.08 \approx -299.7$
Case II	74	72	$-72 \times 4 = -288$	$-72 \times 5.08 \approx -365.7$


WAGE Authenticated Encryption and WG-PRBG

WAGE AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION

- Supports 128-bit key, 128-bit nonce and 128-bit tag
- Operates in sponge-duplex mode with **stronger keyed initialization and finalization phases**


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
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
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SECURITY CLAIMS

- Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity in nonce-respecting setting: 128 bits
- Data limit per key: 2^{64} bits
- Strong security guarantees in related-key setting because of absorbing key blocks via rate

SPONGE-PRBG AND WG-PRBG

- **SPONGE-PRBG**: Start with an initial seed and output 64 bits after each call of WAGE permutation. **Number of rounds to generate 64 bits is 111.**
- **WG-PRBG**: Null some components of WAGE round function (construction in next slide) and use WG stream cipher over \mathbb{F}_{2^7} to generate random bits. **Number of rounds in initialization phase is 74. Then, each output bit is generated in 1 clock cycle.**



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Advantages:

- Low power and energy consumption
- Low latency
- Efficient source for generating random nonces for authenticated encryption

WG-PRBG FROM WAGE ROUND FUNCTION



HARDWARE PERFORMANCE

- Comparison of the different ASIC implementation results of WAGE with other NIST LWC round 2 candidates. Tput, A, F, and E denote throughput, area, maximum frequency, and energy, respectively.

Algorithm ^{†‡}	ST Micro 65 nm				ST Micro 90 nm				IBM 130 nm			
	A [GE]	F [MHz]	Tput [Mbit/s]	E [nJ]	A [GE]	F [MHz]	Tput [Mbit/s]	E [nJ]	A [GE]	F [MHz]	Tput [Mbit/s]	E [nJ]
WAGE [◇]	2900	907	517	20.0	2540	940	535	39.2	2960	153	87.21	30.4
SKINNY-AEAD	-	-	-	-	7179	422	53	-	7456	267	34	-
ASCONE	-	-	-	-	2570	672	14	5,706 μ J/B	-	-	-	-
GIFT-COFB	-	-	-	-	3927	10	22.3 [†]	2.69 [†]	-	-	-	-
Grain-128AEAD	3638.5	1120	560	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Isap-A-128a	-	-	-	-	≤ 12780	≥ 169	2.9 bpc	-	-	-	-	-
SPIX [‡]	2611	100 kHz	81.8 Kbps	-	-	-	-	-	2742	100 kHz	81.8 Kbps	-
SpoC-64 [‡]	2329	100 kHz	58.3 Kbps	-	-	-	-	-	2389	100 kHz	58.3 Kbps	-
SUNDAE-GIFT	-	-	-	-	3494	10	15.9 ^{††}	4.2 [†]	-	-	-	-
TinyJAMBU-128	-	-	-	-	1352*	-	24.6	-	-	-	-	-

^{†‡} Implementations numbers from round 2 submissions.

[◇] Entire cipher including encryption, decryption and control logic

[†] For 16 B and 32 B of associated data and plaintext, respectively

[‡] Encryption circuit only. ^{††} #cycles = 242, * only 112 bit security

- Fair comparison is hard at this stage.

CONCLUSIONS

- We have proposed WAGE, a sponge-based authenticated encryption algorithm, tailored for resource-constrained environments.
- Simple underlying permutation based on Galois NLFSR, two sboxes: WGP and SB, a primitive feedback polynomial, and partial word-wise XORs.
- Offers good security guarantees and hardware efficiency.
- Easily tweakable to WG-PRBG.

Thank you!

Full paper available at:

<https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/8620>

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/435>

For any questions, comments or suggestions, please email us.

Special thanks to [TikZ for Cryptographers](#) for the diagrams.